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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE BOUNDARYLESS
WORKPLACE: THE TENSION BETWEEN DUE
PROCESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Katherine VW Stone*
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, there has been an enormous increase in the
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the workplace. Today,
most large corporations have some system of ADR in place, be it a
formal grievance procedure, an ombudsman, an open door policy, or
a complaint hotline. One particularly controversial form of ADR is
the use of arbitration in the nonunion setting.
Prior to 1991, the use of arbitration by nonunion firms to decide
employment disputes was extremely rare. In 1991, the Supreme
Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp. that an individual
could be compelled to submit his age discrimination complaint to arbitration.' In the wake Gilmer, the use of arbitration and other types
of ADR in the workplace proliferated. In 1995, the Government Accounting Office found that almost ten percent of nonunion firms utilized arbitration for discrimination claims, and another 8.4% were
considering doing So. 2 The evidence suggests that, by the late 1990s,
even more firms had introduced arbitration systems for their nonunion workforces. In 2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Su©
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preme Court removed whatever doubts persisted about the
application of the Federal Arbitration Act to such employment arbitration systems.3 As a result, employers now have wide latitude to design alternative mechanisms to avoid costly and risky employment
litigation.
At present, nearly as many workers are covered by nonunion arbitration systems as are covered by union contracts. 4 In addition to arbitration, the use of workplace mediation, peer review, open door
policies, ombudsmen, and management appeal boards have been
growing rapidly. Thus, it appears that ADR has surpassed unions as
the enforcer of fairness in the workplace. This piece explores the reasons for the rapid growth of workplace ADR and asks whether ADR
can effectively realize the promise of fairness at work.
One common explanation for the growth of ADR in the workplace is that it is a form of union-substitution used to keep unions out.
There is indeed evidence that, in the 1970s and 1980s, some companies instituted grievance procedures, open door policies, and peer review in order to avoid unionization. 5 However, the precipitous
decline of unions by the end of the 1980s made these kinds of elaborate union avoidance schemes unnecessary. Today workplace ADR
plays two different roles in the workplace, both of which are a consequence of the changing nature of work. Below I describe the new
workplace in order to show how it has given rise to a surge in interest
in workplace-specific dispute resolution. I then describe two settings
where ADR mechanisms are widely used and argue that each requires
a different model of dispute resolution-a procedural justice model
for fairness disputes and a public policy model for discrimination disputes. I suggest that the two models are in tension with each other,
and conclude with speculation about whether the new interest in
workplace dispute resolution can in fact satisfy the disparate goals it
sets for itself.

3 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to all
non-transportation employment contracts).
4 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the FederalArbitrationAct,
in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 27, 27-28 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION].

5 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, InstitutionalPressures, Human Resource Strategies, and
the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375
(2003).

2005]

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

I.

IN

THE BOUNDARYLESS

WORKPLACE

503

THE NEW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

The U.S. workplace has undergone a dramatic change in the past
decade. The long-standing assumption of long-term attachment between an employee and a single firm has broken down and a new
form of transitory employment relationship has taken its place. No
longer is employment centered on a single, primary employer
throughout one's career. Instead, employees now expect to change
jobs frequently. No longer do employees derive their identity from a
formal employment relationship with a single firm; rather, their employment identity comes from attachment to an occupation, a skills
cluster, or an industry. At the same time, firms now expect a regular
amount of churning in their workforces. They encourage employees
to look upon their jobs differently, to manage their own careers, and
6
not to expect long-term job security.

This new employment relationship is a vast departure from employment relationships in the past. Roughly one hundred years ago,
the employment relationship underwent a transformation that persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. On the basis of the
scientific management theories of Frederick Winslow Taylor and
those in the personnel management movement, most large corporations organized their workforces into job structures that are termed
"internal labor markets." In internal labor markets, jobs are broken
down into minute tasks and then are arranged into hierarchical ladders in which each job provides the training for the job on the next
rung up. Employers who utilized internal labor markets hired only at
the entry level, then utilized internal promotion to fill all of the
7
higher rungs.
Taylorism became the dominant type of human resource policy
within large U.S. manufacturing firms throughout most of the twentieth century.8 Throughout corporate America, management reduced
6
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8 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, PolicingEmployment Contracts Within the Nexus-ofContracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993).
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the skill level of jobs-a process termed "deskilling"-while at the
same time encouraging employee-firm attachment through promotion and retention policies, explicit or de facto seniority arrangements, elaborate welfare schemes, and longevity-linked benefit
packages. 9 Because employers wanted employees to stay a long time,
they gave them implicit promises of long-term employment and of orderly and predictable patterns of promotion. These were the dominantjob structures of the industrial era. While these systems had their
origins in the blue collar workplace of the smokestack industrial heartland, by the 1960s they were adapted to large white collar workplaces
such as insurance companies and banks. 10
Sometime in the 1970s, employment practices began to change.
Since then, there have been widespread reports that large corporations no longer offer their employees implicit contracts for lifetime
employment. Work has become contingent in the sense that the attachment between the firm and the worker has been weakened. The
"recasualization of work" has reportedly become a fact of life both for
blue collar workers and for high-end professionals and managers.11
As employers dismantle their internal labor market job structures, they are creating new types of employment relationships that
give them flexibility to cross-utilize employees and to make quick adjustments in production methods as they confront increasingly competitive product markets. They want to be able to decrease or
redeploy their work forces quickly as product market opportunities
shift. The new employment relationship is what management theorists and industrial relations specialists call the "new psychological
contract," or the "new deal at work." 12 In the new deal, firms disavow
any long-term employment relationship. However, they also believe
they cannot succeed if employees simply perform their tasks in a reliable but routine manner. Firms do not merely need predictable and
excellent role performance, they need "spontaneous and innovative
9
10

See

STONE,

supra note 6, at 27-48.

HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL

305-12 (1975).

11 See, e.g., The Futureof Work: CareerEvolution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 89; see
also PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE (1995); ROSABETH
Moss KANTER, ROSABETH Moss KANTER ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT

190-91

(1997); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 23 (1998).

12

See

PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN

WORK FORCE 217 (1999); Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the
Psychological Contract: Not the Exception but the Norm, 15J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245
(1994); Denise M. Rousseau, The 'Problem' of the Psychological Contract Considered, 19 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 665 (1998).
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activity that goes beyond role requirements."' 3 They need employees
to commit their imagination, energies, and intelligence on behalf of
their firms. They want employees to innovate, to pitch in, to have an
entrepreneurial attitude toward their jobs, to behave like owners.
Thus, they want to elicit behavior that goes beyond specific roles and
job demands, and gives the firm something extra. Organizational theorists characterize this something extra as organizational citizenship
behavior, or "OCB."'14 Organizational citizenship behavior is defined
as behavior that goes beyond the requirements of specific role definitions. 1 5 Much of current human resource policy is designed to en-

courage that type of behavior.
Managers have been devising new organizational structures that
embody flexibility, promote skill development, and foster OCB. However, they want to elicit OCB without giving promises of job security
and creating the kind of career-long expectations they generated in
the past. That is, the goal of today's management is, in the words of
one management consultant, to foster "commitment without
loyalty." 16

A new employment relationship is emerging through numerous
experimental programs by organizational theorists and management
practitioners. Despite differences in emphasis, the approaches share
several common features. One is that employers explicitly or implicitly promise to give employees employability rather than job security.
They promise to provide learning opportunities that enable employees to develop their human capital but do not promise long-term employment. Thus, employers no longer promise to, nor are they are
expected to, keep employees on the payroll when demand for the
product fluctuates downward. Rather, in the new employment relationship, the risk of the firm's short-term and long-term success is
placed squarely on the employee.
The new employment relationship also involves compensation
systems that peg salaries and wages to market rates rather than internal institutional factors. The emphasis is on offering employees differential pay to reflect differential talents and contributions. Thus,
for example, the leading management consulting firm, Towers Perrin,
urges its clients to "recognize top performers to the greatest extent
possible [by] providing the lion's share of available rewards to the
13 John R. Deckop et al., Getting More Than You Pay For: OrganizationalCitizenship
Behavior and Pay-for-PeIformancePlans, 42 AcAD. MGMT. J. 420, 420 (1999).
14 See DENNIS W. ORGAN, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE

(1998).
Id. at 4-5.
CAPPELLI, supra note 12, at 217.
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highest contributors."' 7 The new employment relationship also involves providing networking opportunities so that employees can raise
their social capital by interacting with a firm's customers, suppliers,
and even competitors. It also is characterized by a flattening of hierarchy and the elimination of status-linked perks. And it is associated
with the use of company-specific grievance mechanisms.
II. THE
A.

SEARCH FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE

New Risks and Vulnerabilities of the New Employment Relationship

The new employment relationship shifts onto employees many
risks that were previously borne by the firm. Foremost, employees
now face a constant risk of job loss due to the continual workforce
churning that characterizes the new workplace. In addition, the new
employment relationship generates a level of wage inequality and
wage uncertainty that was not feasible under the old internal labor
market arrangements. In internal labor markets, wages were set by
institutional factors such as seniority and longevity.1 8 Wages today, on
the other hand, are increasingly pegged to other individualized factors and are sensitive to market fluctuations. One result is wage uncertainty for employees. Gone are the days of reliable and steadily
progressing pay levels along some pre-arranged or pre-agreed-upon
scale. Another result is increasing wage dispersion. Pay rates for similarly-situated employees in different firms and even with a single firm
have become markedly dispersed.
In addition to job insecurity and wage uncertainty, the new employment practices place on employees the risk of losing the value of
their labor market skills. When jobs are redesigned to provide greater
flexibility, their skill requirements often increase. 19 Newly-trained employees thus have an advantage over older ones, and on-going training
becomes not an opportunity for advancement but a necessity for survival. The new employment practices thus impose not only risks ofjob
loss on employees, but also risks of depreciation of one's own skill
base. Rather than being able to count on a rising wage level and a
17 Chris Hatch & Claudine Kapel, Talent Management Remains CriticalEven in the
Face of Economic Turbulence, PERSP. ON PEOPLE: PERFORMANCE & REWARDS (Towers Perrin), May 2002, available at www.towersperrin.com/hrservices/webcache/towers/Canada/publications/Periodicals/perspectivePerfRewards/2002_05/pprtalent.pdf.
18 See Stone, supra note 6, at 51-56.
19 For a series of case studies that support this conclusion, see Harry C. Katz,
Industry Studies of Wage Inequality: Symposium Introduction, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
399 (2001).
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comfortable retirement, many workers are anticipating a lifetime of
retooling just to stay in place.
Another type of risk that is generated by the new employment
relationship involves the dissolution of stable and reliable employee
old age and social welfare benefits. In the United States, workers obtain health insurance, pensions, disability, long-term care, and most
other forms of social insurance from their employers-when they can
get it-rather than from the state. Because social insurance is tied to
employment, even if there were no changes in employer benefit policies or practices, the new employment relationship would erode the
social safety net. As job security wanes, and more and more people
move from job to job, they usually lose whatever employer-sponsored
benefits they once had. Furthermore, employers have been restructuring their plans so as to shift more risk of uncertainty onto employees. This is most evident in the area of pensions. In the past, almost
all private pensions were "defined benefit" plans. In a defined benefit
plan, employers contribute to a fund on behalf of its covered employees, and each employee is guaranteed a specified benefit level at the
time of retirement. Since the 1980s, many employers have shifted
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, so that today, defined contribution plans have overtaken defined benefit plans
as the dominant form of employer-provided pension in the United
States. 20 In defined contribution plans, the employer contributes a
fixed amount into an account for each worker based on the number
of person-hours worked. In some cases, the worker makes a contribution as well. Upon retirement, the amount of the worker's pension is
determined by the value of that account at that time. If the funds
were invested well, or if the market did well overall, the worker's pension could be high. But if they were invested poorly, or if retirement
occurred amidst a market downturn, the pension could be paltry.
The risk, both of the market and of bad decisions, falls on the individual employee.
B.

ProceduralJustice to Cushion Risks of the New
Employment Relationship

Because so many risks now fall upon employees, employees may
be unwilling to assume these risks unless they have assurances that the
system is fundamentally fair. While employees no longer expect longterm employment, they want to ensure that wage assessments are
done fairly, that they are not terminated unfairly, and that they are
20

See

STONE,

supra note 6, at 252-55.
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given the training opportunities, benefit packages, and other job incidents that they have been promised. They also want to obtain the
networking opportunities that spell career advancement. Without a
perception of fairness and implicit reciprocity, there is a danger that
employees will not give the extra effort that constitutes citizenship behavior. Thus, employees' subjective appraisal of their employers' fairness is seen as an important factor in generating OCB. Researchers
have found that employees who perceive their employer as unfair reduce their OCB, triggering a downward cycle in which the employee's
diminished OCB leads the supervisor to withdraw informal types of
affirmation, causing the employee to experience additional feelings of
unfairness and to further decrease her OCB.2 1 Hence organizational

theorists advocate that employers establish a system for providing onthe-job fairness as a means of fostering

OCB.

22

Concern for generating OCB has led theorists to focus on the
role of procedural justice and employee perceptions of fairness. 23 Or-

ganizational psychologist Dennis Organ explains that people in organizations perceive themselves as involved in a social exchange
relationship, in which they contribute effort and citizenship in return
for formal and informal rewards. When they encounter what they
perceive to be unfair treatment, they revise their assessment of the
nature of the overall exchange, retreat from an assumption of reci24
procity, and reinterpret the relationship as an economic transaction.
A number of organizational behavioral theorists have proposed
definitions of procedural fairness. One widely-used measure of procedural fairness proposed by G.S. Leventhal utilizes six criteria. To be
fair, according to Leventhal, a procedure must:
(a) be consistently applied;
21 See Dennis W. Organ & Mary Konovsky, Cognitive Versus Affective Determinantsof
OrganizationalCitizenshipBehavior, 74J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 157, 162 (1989); see also Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing Objectives and the PsychologicalContract:A Longitudinal
Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 149 (1994) (finding that citizenship may result from
employees' perceptions of the company's performance of its obligations under the
psychological contract).
22 SeeJerald Greenberg, THE QUEST FORJUSTICE ON THEJOB 32-39 (1996). See
generally Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millenium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25
Years of OrganizationalJustice Research, 86J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 435-37 (2001) (analyzing various empirical studies and different concepts of justice).
23 See GREENBERG, supra note 22, at 32-39 (1996). See generally Colquitt et. al.,
supra note 22, at 435-36 (analyzing various empirical studies and different concepts
of justice).
24 Dennis W. Organ, The MotivationalBasis of OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior, in
12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 43, 63-66 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1990).
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(b) be free from bias;
(c) ensure that accurate information is collected and used in the
decision-making process;
(d) have a mechanism to correct flawed decisions;
(e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of ethics;
(f) ensure that the opinions of various affected groups have been
25
taken into account.
All of these criteria are about the process by which rules are applied and disputes are resolved; they are not about substantive
outcomes.
There is evidence that as firms disavow promises of job security,
procedural fairness becomes more important than ever. For example,
a study of 3000 employees by the Towers Perrin consulting firm in
1997 found that the changes in the employment relationship had
made employees more sensitive to whether they were treated with fairness and respect. 26 It is understandable that employees would focus
on procedural fairness when they lack promises of long-term employment because in this new employment relationship, employees are required to bear many of the risks that were previously borne by the
firm. Because employees increasingly have to bear the consequences
of firm failure or market fluctuations, they at least want to be confident that the incidence of the risks are fairly applied.
Because organizational performance is linked to procedural justice, employers have attempted to devise procedures for hearing complaints and resolving disputes that foster a perception of fair
treatment. These procedures are a far cry from the management
methods of the nineteenth century, when Andrew Carnegie famously
said: "When a workman raises his head, hit it." Today employers have
instituted a wide range of dispute resolution procedures designed to
27
address employee complaints.
For example, some corporations maintain open door policies
that encourage an employee to bring a problem or grievance to a
25 See Colquitt et al., supra note 22, at 426 (citing Gerald S. Leventhal, What
Should Be Done With Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairnessin Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J.
Gergen et al. eds., 1980); Gerald S. Leventhal et al., Beyond Fairness:A Theory of Allocation Preferences, inJUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerold Mikula ed., 1980)).
26 Mark V. Roehling et al., The Nature of the New Employment Relationship:A Content
Analysis of the Practitionerand Academic Literatures, 39 HuM. RESOURCES MGMT. 305, 315
(2000).
27 See Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment:
The Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 95, 103-13
(discussing the growth of ombudsmen, mediation, and arbitration programs amongst
nonunion firms); Colvin, supra note 5.
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high-level manager outside the chain of command. Some have hired
specialized corporate officers, called ombudsmen, whose job it is to
hear complaints, conflicts, and disputes, and to reach across status
and departmental lines to seek resolution. Some have established
management appeals boards to permit an employee to appeal an objectionable decision of an immediate supervisor to managers in other
departments or divisions. Peer review procedures, in which disputes
are resolved by panels comprised of fellow employees who hear and
decide specific employee grievances, are also becoming a common
practice. 28 A recent survey of over 300 firms in the telecommunicain 15.9% of the
tions industry found peer review procedures in place
29
incidence.
high
surprisingly
a
firms in the sample,
A common characteristic of these employer-initiated dispute resolution techniques is that they all utilize decisionmakers who are from
the firm but outside the employees' normal chain of command. The
peer review plan at aerospace and automobile parts manufacturer
TRW illustrates how these new systems are designed to promote procedural justice without reinforcing hierarchy. At TRW, peer review
can be invoked by any employee who wants to challenge a supervisory
disciplinary measure, including termination. The review panel consists of five regular peer employees, three selected by the employee
and two by management. 30 The panel holds a hearing, accepts evidence, and then issues a decision. It has no authority to change company policy, merely to ensure that it was3 1applied correctly. If it was
not, the disciplinary measure is revoked.
The purpose of these new nonunion employee dispute resolution
procedures is to create a perception of procedural fairness that will
enable the employee to assume the risk of the employment relationship while augmenting rather than diminishing citizenship behavior.
The goal is not to approximate justice. Thus, for example, Professor
Alex Colvin found that in one TRW plant between 1992 and 1997, 160
employees took cases to peer review, but only ten were successful in
overturning a supervisory decision. The low employee win rate none-

28

See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

(2000).
29 See Colvin, supra note 5, at 382, 386.
30 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 643, 652 (2001).
31 See id. at 658.
RESOLUTION

2005]

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN

THE

BOUNDARYLESS

WORKPLACE

511

theless was sufficient to promote a sense of procedural fairness by the
firm.32
C.

Assessing the Due Process Model of Dispute Resolution

Because workplace-centered due process forms of dispute resolution do not ensure substantively "fair" outcomes, one might ask: Are
they just a sham or do they contribute important values to the workplace? This is a highly controversial question, the answer to which, in
large part, depends upon what one is comparing them to. Compared
to Andrew Carnegie's personnel practices, the newly minted forms of
due process at work seem like a vast improvement because they give
employees some voice about working conditions and enable them to
get redress for the most egregious forms of mistreatment. But compared to the grievance systems in U.S. unions or German-style works
councils, they look minimal at best. And because they neither foster
nor reflect collective empowerment, they are not a substitute for unions. They are creatures of the new employment relationship that
must be understood as part of a larger vision of a non-hierarchical
workplace with committed yet non-attached employees.
One important aspect of these procedural justice types of workplace ADR is that they draw their substantive norms from the workplace itself. When an open door policy or a management appeal
board is utilized, the decisionmaker is expected to apply the workplace's own internal code of conduct, both the formal and informal
rules. Even peer review panels are generally restricted in their powers
and forbidden to disregard the rules of the workplace. 33 Thus, while
the decisionmaker may not always uphold a managerial decision, a
procedural justice style of workplace ADR will reinforce the prevailing
workplace culture. Its function is to instantiate and effectuate the
workplace's internal norms.
III.

THIRD PARTfy FoRMs Or DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE WORKPLACE

In addition to the proliferation of forms of ADR that rely on
workplace participants, there has also been an increase in forms of
ADR that utilize outside neutrals, i.e., mediation and arbitration. Mediation is a method by which an outside neutral helps parties achieve
a consensual resolution of a dispute. Arbitration is a system by which
32

See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Citizens and Citadels: Dispute Resolution and the

Governance of Employment Relations 189, 213 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author).

33

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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an outside neutral hears evidence and imposes a resolution on the
parties. Both mediation and arbitration involve the injection of outsiders into the workplace culture. Despite its use of outsiders, however, mediation shares one goal with peer review and open door
policies-to resolve conflict using the internal perspectives of the participants as its normative guiding light. Indeed, the current view of
best mediator practice is that mediators should not impose their own
views of the best resolution of a dispute, but rather facilitate the parties' resolution according to their own normative sense of fairness.
Arbitration, in contrast, brings an external perspective to bear on a
dispute. Such an outside perspective is necessary to address some
types of workplace disputes, particularly those that involve employment discrimination. For reasons that will be explained below, ADR
that simply instantiates the workplace's own internal norms cannot
adequately address discrimination in the new workplace.
A.

New Types of Discrimination Claims

In the past, much employment discrimination was rooted in the
hierarchical job structures of internal labor markets. Today's workplace does not have as much formal hierarchy, so there are less formal
impediments to advancement. At the same time, because there are
not defined job ladders and the criteria for advancement are not
clearly specified, it is difficult for someone to claim that she has been
bypassed for advancement because of her gender or race. That is, the
diffuse authority structure of the new psychological contract makes
discrimination hard to identify and difficult to challenge.
In addition to the hidden nature of the decisionmaking process,
the decentralization of authority and the flattening of hierarchy mean
that decisions are delegated to a wide range of people who are permitted to use their individual, often idiosyncratic, discretion. Also, when
jobs are defined in terms of competencies and employees are valued
for their varied skills and flexibility, it is difficult for firms to articulate
clear criteria for advancement. Often "social credentials" are used in
lieu of objective performance measures. 34 These social credentials include such assets as prestigious education, membership in social clubs,
participation in certain sports-all activities that have traditionally ex"socluded women and minorities. Thus, under a system that rewards
35
disadvantaged.
are
minorities
and
women
cial credentials,"
34 See Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male CorporateHierarchy: A Full Circle Approach, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 117, 167-68 (2002).
35 See id.
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A growing number of employment discrimination class action
lawsuits allege that informal and decentralized promotion practices
foster covert discrimination against women and minorities. For example, in a suit filed in 2001 against Johnson & Johnson, the plaintiffs
alleged that the giant conglomerate knowingly engaged in racial discrimination by maintaining promotion policies that allowed supervisors to "'handpick white candidates, resulting in fewer promotions for
African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans and perpetuating a "glass
ceiling" and "glass walls," thereby blocking advancement of these employees into "visible and influential roles" within the organization.' "36
Similar complaints against informal promotion policies are becoming
widespread.
In addition, the new nonhierarchical workplace makes power and
lines of authority less visible. It is often difficult to know to whom to
make appeals, with whom to lodge complaints, or how to bring about
change. There are numerous cases in which an employee experiences
sexual harassment and wants to complain, yet loses because she did
not know to whom to report the offensive conduct or because she
3
reported to the wrong person.

7

These cases illustrate the more general proposition that when
there is no visible power structure, the invisible structures rule. In the
new workplace, these invisible power structures may well turn out to
be more remote and impenetrable for women and minorities than the
old power structures. Responsibility for discriminatory decisions has
become difficult to assign and even more difficult to remedy.
Furthermore, it is difficult to meet the legal test to establish liability for discrimination in today's workplace. If a plaintiff alleges discriminatory treatment, she must show that the employer treated her
in a disadvantageous way with a discriminatory intent.3 8 Proving the
employer's discriminatory intent is the most important, and most difficult, task of the plaintiff. However, the available techniques for demonstrating an unlawful motive only make sense in a world in which
employers make employment decisions on the basis of uniform policies and practices that can be articulated. In such a world, if an employer departs from its uniform policy or pre-existing practices, then
36 Beth M. Mantz, Dow Jones News Wires, Johnson &Johnson DiscriminationSuit
May Be One of Largest Ever, Nov. 16, 2001 (quoting the plaintiffs' complaint), available
at http://www.diversityatwork.com/news/dec01/Johnson.htm.
37 See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof'l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614
(4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999);
Oct. 22,
Schrean v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 97 CV 3455, 1999 WL 977068 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
38 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973).
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the plaintiff can use that fact to show that the employer's proffered
reason is a pretext. When employers have uniform policies and practices, these policies establish a baseline against which an employer's
actions can be measured and a pretext can be identified. Indeed,
without evidence that an employer's practice is a departure from a
uniform baseline, it is practically impossible for a plaintiff to prove
that an employer's asserted motive is a pretext.
It is difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with a
discriminatory intent in today's workplace. In the boundaryless workplace, employment decisions are decentralized. Rather than promoting uniform policies and centralized decisionmaking, many firms
today delegate job assignment decisions to disparate, decentralized
decisionmakers. Sometimes these decisionmakers are peers. In the
boundaryless workplace, decisionmakers are expected to exercise subjective, often ad hocjudgments. In this setting, it is difficult to establish whether a particular decision is pretextual because there is no
uniform baseline from which the employer's deviation can be identified. The baseline is constantly changing.
In addition to the difficulties of identifying discrimination and
locating the responsible party in the face of decentralized and dispersed decisionmaking structures, the new workplace exacerbates the
problem of coworker discrimination. Today, discrimination often
takes the form of cliques, patronage networks, and buddy systems that
utilize tools such as ostracism and subtle forms of non-sexual harassment (as well as sexual harassment) to exclude and disempower newcomers. The harms caused can be devastating to the victim, yet not
cognizable under existing theories of discrimination. Existing theories of liability assume that the discriminator is in a hierarchical relationship to the complainant. Woman and minority plaintiffs who
complain of coworker harassment must prove that the employer knew
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take remedial measures. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on both issues,
and the burden is formidable. If a worker fails to report coworker
harassment for fear of subtle and not-so-subtle retaliation, her failure
to report makes it easy for a firm to deny knowledge of the harassment
and thus escape liability. Some courts find that the employer is on
notice of harassment if other employees have reported similar incidents, 39 but not all courts do so. Similarly, some courts will find that
39 See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that reporting policies cannot increase a plaintiffs burden under the law); see also
B. Glenn George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 153-54 (2001).
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an employer is not on notice of harassment if the employee complains
to the wrong supervisor.4 0
Finally, remedies become problematic in a world of flattened hierarchies. Many types of discrimination involve failure to promote women and minorities along stable job ladders, and the remedies
include decrees to move them up to their "rightful" places. When
there are no such job ladders, it is difficult not only to identify discrimination, but also to remedy it.
B.

FramingNew Proceduresfor New Types of Discrimination

In order to make further strides toward equality in the workplace,
is
necessary to devise new antidiscrimination theories and proceit
dures. At present, employment discrimination claims are brought to a
court or an administrative agency such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a state human rights agency. These tribunals have the virtue of placing decisionmaking authority in the hands
of someone who is not part of the workplace that gave rise to the
alleged discrimination and who can apply neutral, nondiscriminatory
norms. However, both courts and agencies are also remote from the
workplace, circumscribed in the evidence they can hear, and limited
in the remedies they can issue. Furthermore, as Judith Resnik has
pointed out, courts and agencies have constricted approaches to legal
standing that prevent them from treating discrimination as the collective harm that it is. Rather, by requiring the individual targets of discrimination to bring an action, courts cannot address the ways in
shapes power relationwhich a culture of harassment can arise that
41
ships among all individuals in a workplace.
Furthermore, much of today's discrimination takes the form of
coworker conduct that marginalizes a member of an outsider group.
It is difficult to imagine a court imposing civil liability on a group of
workers for ganging up on a coworker or for spreading nefarious gos40 Compare Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir.
2000) (affirming summary judgment for the employer when the employee did not
report to the proper representative), withJackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 663
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that harassing conduct need not be reported by the
plaintiff).
41 See Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring
Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 247
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). Susan Sturm has also pointed
out that the activities that produce exclusion of women and blacks is highly contextualized and not amenable to crisp, clear rules of right and wrong. See Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 475-78 (2001).
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sip unless the conduct constitutes a cognizable crime or tort, such as
assault or rape.
In addition, it is not always feasible for individuals to obtain redress from a court or administrative agency. Courts and agencies are
inundated with complaints and have large backlogs. Litigation is expensive and many victims of employment discrimination lack the resources to enforce their rights.
Even if the courts were not backlogged and litigation were inexpensive, there is an additional reason why new forms of discrimination
are not best handled in an adversary procedure. The adversary process gives each side a stake in proving the truthfulness of its claims and
the falsity of the opposing party's claims, even when doing so inflicts
damage on a continuing relationship. Where complaints involve allegations of exclusion, marginalization, or subtle forms of harassment,
the complaining party must either demonize her coworkers or risk
demonization herself. For example, if a plaintiff complains she has
been shunned and denied access to informal know-how, her coworkers might defend by claiming that they refused to socialize with her
because they disliked her and found her to be obnoxious or even
paranoid. The complaining party then must counter by impugning
the motives and good faith of the dominant group, accusing them of
racism, sexism, or worse. That is, the courtroom setting tends to make
each side exaggerate its accusations and harden its position rather
than seek conciliatory solutions. In a harassment case, this kind of
name-calling occurs not as lunchroom gossip, but in the open of a
public trial. Even if the accusations are true-and they frequently
contain considerable truth-the public nature of the setting makes it
unlikely that such a dynamic will help a workplace to function better.
For all these reasons, conventional litigation is not always an effective option for remedying employment discrimination and it is necessary to devise a dispute resolution procedure that can supplement
existing judicial mechanisms. Some employers have attempted to use
the dispute resolution mechanisms discussed earlier to address discrimination claims. However, it is difficult to devise internal dispute
resolution systems that can help counteract the development of workplace fiefdoms and cliques, redress abuses of hidden authority, and
bring external norms to the workplace.
Most ADR mechanisms are designed to apply norms internal to
the workplace to a situation of conflict and thus they cannot address
these second-generation forms of discrimination in a reliable and con-
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sistent fashion. 42 Any procedure used to redress employment discrimination must not delegate responsibility for recognizing and
remedying discriminatory conduct to the work group, because the
work group is often the source of the problem. Similarly, it cannot
delegate those tasks to top management, because top managers have
an interest in smooth operations, which often means condoning the
discriminatory conduct. Instead, it is necessary to devise a system of
workplace-specific alternative dispute resolution that utilizes neutral
outsiders to scrutinize workplace conduct, identify subtle as well as
overt discriminatory practices, bring external norms of equal opportunity to bear, and fashion effective remedies. By bringing in outside
neutrals to adjudicate workplace disputes, such a system could offer
the possibility of injecting an external standard of fairness that can
transcend the rule of the clique.
Two types of alternative dispute resolution involve the use of
outside neutrals-mediation and arbitration. While mediation has
the virtue of resulting in a consensual resolution to a dispute, it is not
always possible to resolve discrimination claims in such a forum.
Mediators aspire to a stance of neutrality, yet neutrality compels them
to refrain from intervening to correct power disparities that might exist between the parties-disparities in resources, sophistication, knowledge, or experience-that might compromise one side's ability to
negotiate a fair settdement of the dispute. In discrimination cases, the
complainant is by definition a member of a subordinate group, so that
disparities in power are almost always present. Thus, mediation usually is not appropriate for the types of discrimination cases described
here. Rather, there must be an outsider who is empowered to hear
claims and make an independent decision to resolve a dispute. That
means there has to be a system of arbitration.
C.

The Uses and Abuses of Workplace Arbitration

The use of arbitration in the nonunion workplace has been growing at a fast pace. After the Gilmer decision in 1991, employers instituted arbitration systems in almost ten percent of nonunion
42 Susan Sturm gives examples of internal dispute resolution systems established
by Deloitte & Touche, Intel, and Home Depot to deal with complaints of subtle forms
of gender bias and exclusion that decreased women's advancement prospects. However, the success in each case depends upon a single individual in a position of authority who is committed to advancing women's causes within the firm. Furthermore,
the case studies do not illustrate how a firm can use an internal dispute resolution
mechanism to bring about sustainable change. See Sturm, supra note 40.
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workplaces. 43 In part, the increase in workplace dispute resolution is
due to certain legal developments. Since the 1980s, there has been a
growth in employment litigation and employers have been found liable for unjust dismissal in some jurisdictions, employment discrimination in a variety of guises, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, slander, and other types of workplace
torts. In order to reduce their exposure, employers have tried to identify and resolve issues before they reach litigation proportions. The
Supreme Court decisions in Gilmer and Circuit City applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to employer-crafted arbitration procedures
in the nonunion setting enables employers to use arbitration as a
shield against liability or a method to mitigate awards. Under the
FAA, when there is a written arbitration clause in effect, courts must
stay litigation and compel arbitration instead. 44
Because most employment arbitration procedures are crafted by
employers, they are often drafted in ways that make it likely that an
employer will prevail in the arbitration proceeding. For example,
some place severe limits on discovery, limit the number of witnesses or
types of evidence an employee can present, shorten limitations periods, heighten burdens of proof, and restrict remedies that could be
recovered. 45 In addition, some are drafted in a way that imposes
asymmetrical obligations-requiring a worker but not the employer to
submit all disputes to arbitration. Some permit the employer to pick
the pool from which the arbitrator will be selected. Some require
workers to bear a substantial cost for bringing a case to arbitration.
Courts are divided as to whether such procedures can be enforced. 4 6
43 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); supra text
accompanying note 1.
44 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000).
45 See, e.g., Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993)
(enforcing an arbitration agreement that had been sent by the employer to the employee by mail and to which the employee never consented); Pony Express Courier
Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App. 1996) (rejecting an unconscionability
challenge to an arbitration system in which the employee had no discovery rights and
severely restricted remedies). See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
1017, 1036-41 (1996).
46 Compare Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding asymmetrical arbitration clauses not unconscionable, but stating, in dicta,
that if an employee were required to pay arbitral fees to have her claim heard in
arbitration, a clause would be unconscionable), with Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding an arbitration clause that imposed steep costs on
a party seeking to vindicate statutory rights is not per se unconscionable), and Stirlen
v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an asymmetrical
arbitration clause requiring the employee to arbitrate but not the employer and re-
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Initially courts upheld employer-crafted arbitration procedures
that contained serious due process deficiencies in their pro-arbitration zeal. 47 As a result, in the 1990s, many employers adopted policies
that compelled employees to bring their employment discrimination
complaints to arbitrators who were biased in favor of the employer or
who simply lacked knowledge of anti-discrimination law. Further,
under current interpretations of the FAA, arbitration awards receive
virtually no judicial review. 48 Decisions rendered by biased decisionmakers or in unfair proceedings could not be appealed. 49
Gradually throughout the 1990s, courts began to disallow many
of these unfair procedures by ruling them unconscionable or unenforceable on due process grounds. For example, courts have held
that it is unconscionable to require an employee to pay excessive fees
to have her claims heard, 50 or that it is improper to require an em51
ployee to arbitrate claims when the employer is not similarly bound.
One court held that an arbitral panel that was hand-picked by an em52
ployer was not a proper "arbitration" under the FAA.

Despite the potential abuses of employer-crafted arbitration systems in the past, it is possible to design a dispute resolution system
that could address the subtle but powerful forms of discrimination in
today's workplaces. This use of ADR would not merely provide procedural justice but also be a method of implementing substantive public
policies. Such a system would seek to vindicate equality norms without the limitations imposed by current Title VII doctrine. For examstricting potential remedies an employee could recover is unconscionable and unenforceable). See also Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999),
where an arbitration system where the employer selected the panel from which the
arbitrators were chosen was held not to be unenforceable.
47 See Stone, supra note 44, at 1036-41.
48 Under the FAA, an arbitral award may not be vacated for an error of law or
erroneous fact-finding, but only if the arbitral award displayed a "manifest disregard"
of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). See generallyKatherine V. W. Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitration Act,
77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 954-55 (1999) (citing cases that establish the narrow standard of
review under the FAA).
49 For criticisms of employer-designed arbitration systems in the nonunion setting, see Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine and
Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (1996); David S. Schwartz,
EnforcingSmall Printto Protect Big Business:Employee and ConsumerRights Claims in an Age
of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33; Stone, supra note 48.
50 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1488; see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 95 (holding that the
plaintiff failed to show sufficient likelihood of excessive costs).
51 Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
52 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
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pie, decisionmakers could take into account many kinds of evidence,
including shop history and lore, to identify departures from past practices and consider whether or not an employer's stated reasons for an
action were pretextual. Furthermore, claimants could impugn the
plausibility of an employer's asserted reason for taking an action that
disadvantaged a woman or minority employee by showing that the action was irrational or inconsistent with sound business judgment-arguments that, while comporting with common sense, are not
persuasive to a court in a Title VII case. In addition, workplace arbitration could embrace disputes between coworkers as well as disputes
between employees and employers. While a court may not find a particular type of conduct sufficiently serious to be actionable under Title
VII, an arbitrator may be better attuned to the contextualized nature
of the harm done.
To ensure that arbitration can adequately identify and redress
subtle forms of employment discrimination that arise in the new workplace, courts would have to impose minimal standards of due process
on the arbitration process. 53 Thus, for example, a court would have to
ensure that the complainant had a right to counsel, to take discovery,
subpoena witnesses, obtain documents, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The arbitration procedure could not unduly shorten limitations periods, shift burdens of proof, or impose high costs on the
party seeking to vindicate her discrimination claim. Furthermore, an
outside arbitrator would not merely have to apply norms internal to
the workplace, but also serve as a check on the possibility of tyranny
and capture by insider cliques. That is, the arbitrator would have to
apply the external norms embodied in anti-discrimination law. Under
this proposal, there would have to be de novojudicial review for issues
of law to ensure that arbitrators did not merely defer to the rule of the
clique, but rather applied Title VII and other employment laws to the
workplace. In order to preserve the right of appeal, a record would
have to be made, and a written opinion rendered.
Workplace arbitration, as proposed herein, would cost more than
most current forms of nonunion arbitration because it requires a transcript, a reasonably full hearing, and a written opinion. However,
such a procedure offers employers a relatively expeditious factfinding
procedure that could stave off many lawsuits. Employment discrimination suits are often factually dense matters, so that when documentary evidence and credibility assessments can be determined in an
53

See Stone, supra note 48, at 1024-28 (suggesting a mechanism to provide in-

creased scrutiny and to inject external norms into private arbitration tribunals).
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arbitral review setting, employers and employees can often be spared
lengthy and expensive litigation.
CONCLUSION

I have described two models of ADR in the changing workplacea procedural justice model and a public policy model. The first involves using ADR to reinforce and apply existing workplace values.
The second involves using ADR to change the normative life of the
community and inject external notions of racial and gender justice.
Each model applies to different types of disputes, although it would
be easy to imagine a dispute that could be characterized as both. In
such a case it would be necessary to consider what to do with the overlap. For present purposes, however, the larger question is can the
models co-exist? Does building up one type of ADR system undermine the possibilities for the second? Obviously there is no barrier to
a company having more than one dispute resolution program, and
indeed many companies do just that. A recent book by David Lipsky,
Ron Seeber, and Richard Fincher shows that some companies have
dispute resolution systems that are so complex and multi-optioned
that their organizational diagrams look like maps of the Paris subway
system. 54 But there is nonetheless an important respect in which an
internal norm-applying due process system might be incompatible
with an external norm-based public policy system. That is, there is a
danger that bolstering the internal self-regulatory aspects of the workplace by means of dispute resolution aimed at enhancing procedural
justice could, in fact, intensify the cliquishness that makes the external
dispute resolution system necessary. Conversely, an ADR system with
external decisionmakers to impose external standards of conduct
could undermine the ability of dispute resolution to provide procedural justice and generate organizational citizenship behavior. The tension between the two uses of workplace ADR is an issue that will
require further research and discussion into the roles and functions of
dispute resolution in the new and changing workplace.

54

See DAVID B.

LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CON-

FLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS

151 fig.4.3 (2003).
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